Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mehmet Bac

    (University of Chicago and Bilkent University)

  • Parimal Kanti Bag

    (University of London)

Abstract

We study and compare law enforcement costs under two alternative burden of proof rules with the objective of reducing crime to a target level. We show that presuming innocence rather than guilt has a cost advantage, mainly due to lower costs of preventing collusion between law enforcers and criminals. This conclusion may change if law enforcers are incorruptible or if resources to motivate corruptible law enforcers are limited. We identify the strengths and weaknesses of the two burden of proof rules in terms of components of law enforcement costs such as ``information gathering" costs, ``collusion prevention" costs, and (when the potential offender is an official) ``agent compensation" costs.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0194.pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0194.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0194

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
  3. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  4. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer.
  5. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May.
  6. Davis, Michael L, 1994. "The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 343-59, October.
  7. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1991. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-24, Fall.
  10. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
  11. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
  12. repec:att:wimass:8908 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 322-344, December.
  14. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 378-405, Summer.
  15. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 277-98, October.
  16. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1997. "The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 431-447, September.
  17. James Andreoni, 1991. "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 385-395, Autumn.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2007.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.