The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes
AbstractThis article models the fact-finding process as one in which a defendant is accused of violating some legal standard (e.g., exceeding the speed limit). The fact finder cannot observe the actual behavior but observes some variable that is a noisy signal of the truth (e.g., the reading from a radar detector). From this signal it is possible to calculate the probability of guilt. The standard of proof (the minimal probability necessary to convict) that minimizes the expected cost of error is seen as a trade-off between the expected cost of false acquittals and convictions. A simple example shows that a clearer signal of truth (a more reliable radar detector) may not always lower error costs, because the utility of a fact-finding method depends also on the population of defendants and the standard of proof. These results clarify the source of disagreements over different fact-finding procedures. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2000. "Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 120, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, 2006.
"A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 339-363, 06.
- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012.
"In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures,"
Department of Economics University of Siena
637, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS04, School of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002.
"Preponderance of Evidence,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
725, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2004.
"Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2004. "Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof," Cahiers de recherche 0418, CIRPEE.
- Lehmann, Markus A., 2002. "Error minimization and deterrence in agency control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 373-391, May.
- Kobayashi, Bruce H. & Lott, John Jr., 1996. "In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 397-416, December.
- Bruce Lyons & Gordon Menzies & Daniel Zizzo, 2012. "Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of merger regulation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 465-499, September.
- Ognedal, Tone, 2005. "Should the Standard of Proof be Lowered to Reduce Crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 45-61, March.
- Christoph Engel, 2008. "Preponderance of the Evidence versus Intime Conviction. A Behavioural Perspective on a Conflict between American and Continental European Law," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_33, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.