Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation
AbstractThe information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents. The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small. The optimal liability rule trades off the injurers' incentives to take precautions and the plaintiff's incentive to create public information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, TÃ¼bingen, Mohr Siebeck, TÃ¼bingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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