Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation
Abstract
The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents. The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small. The optimal liability rule trades off the injurers' incentives to take precautions and the plaintiff's incentive to create public information.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 215-
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
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Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2007.
"Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer,"
Discussion Papers
0607-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Friehe, Tim, 2009. "Screening accident victims," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 272-280, September.
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