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The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System

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Author Info
Shavell, Steven

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Abstract

The legal system is an expensive social institution, raising the question of whether the amount of litigation is socially appropriate. The thesis developed here is that it is not--because of fundamental differences between private and social incentives to use the legal system. These differences permeate litigation, affecting decisions about the bringing of suits, settlement versus trial, and trial expenditures. The private-social divergence is attributable to two externalities: when a party makes a litigation decision, he does not take into account the legal costs that he induces others to incur (a negative externality), nor does he recognize associated effects on deterrence and certain other social benefits (a positive externality). Consequently, the privately determined level of litigation can either be socially excessive or inadequate and may call for corrective social policies. A variety of policies are discussed, including taxation versus subsidy of suit, fee-shifting, and promotion versus discouragement of settlement. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 575-612
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:575-612

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  1. Kathryn Spier & Xinyu Hua, . "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1081, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Duke, Joshua M. & Jost, Ryan P., 2000. "The Mediation Of Variance Conflicts: An Empirical Evaluation," Staff Papers 15833, University of Delaware, Department of Food and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kathryn Spier, 2001. "The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1024, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007. "An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Discussion Papers 0607-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Álvaro Bustos, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Common Law Courts," Documentos de Trabajo 352, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  11. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Legal Change and the Social Value of Lawsuits," Working papers 2008-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue," Working papers 2008-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. repec:bep:eapcon:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:1202-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
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