We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher but somewhat imprecise standard may be interpreted as reflecting a tradeoff between providing incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the common law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civilian features.
Nous argumentons que le standard de preuve en common law, compte tenu des contraintes de recevabilité en matière de preuve, n'a pas pour effet de minimiser l'erreur attendue comme le soutient la littérature juridique, mais qu'il peut être efficient d'un point de vue incitatif. Par comparaison, le standard de preuve plus fort mais imprécis des pays de droit codifié peut s'interpréter comme résultant d'un arbitrage entre minimisation des erreurs et effets incitatifs. Dans notre modèle, le système légal optimal a des règles ressemblant à celle de la common law quand les préoccupations incitatives sont primordiales. Lorsqu'une plus grande importance est attachée à l'élimination des erreurs de justice, le système optimal a des caractéristiques proches des systèmes de droit codifié.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)