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Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings

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  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld
  • David E.M. Sappington

Abstract

We view the court system as an institution that enables defendants to signal their innocence or guilt, and we examine how the court can optimally minimize expected social losses from errors of type I and type II and from expenditures by defendants. Two of the policy instruments assumed available to the court are the standard of proof of one's innocence and the penalty imposed on a defendant who fails to meet the standard. Our analysis focuses on the effects that variations in the levels of these instruments have on the expenditures of defendants.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 308-315

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:summer:p:308-315

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Web page: http://www.rje.org

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Cited by:
  1. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, EconWPA.
  2. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 101-108, January.
  3. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 191-210, April.
  4. Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  5. Christoph Engel, 2008. "Preponderance of the Evidence versus Intime Conviction. A Behavioural Perspective on a Conflict between American and Continental European Law," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_33, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  6. Bartsch, Elga, 1996. "Enforcement of environmental liability in the case of uncertain causality and asymmetric information," Kiel Working Papers 755, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  7. Bruce Lyons & Gordon Menzies & Daniel Zizzo, 2012. "Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of merger regulation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 465-499, September.
  8. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
  9. Kobayashi, Bruce H. & Lott, John Jr., 1996. "In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 397-416, December.

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