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Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design

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  • Bull, Jesse
  • Watson, Joel

Abstract

In this short paper, we show how hard evidence can be incorporated into the mechanism-design framework. We model the parties' inalienable decisions (evidence production) as distinct from an arbitrarily-designed message form. A mechanism specifies the message form and how the public decision is a function of messages and evidence. Our work is thus along the lines of Myerson (1982, 1991), whose mechanism-design analysis nicely distinguishes between inalienable private and public decisions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC San Diego in its series University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt7715f08f.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt7715f08f

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Keywords: mechanism-design model; evidence production;

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References

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  1. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
  2. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
  3. Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
  4. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
  5. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
  6. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/168, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Evans, R., 2006. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0627, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  9. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact Finding," Working Papers 0612, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  10. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
  11. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  12. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  13. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  14. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1715-1736, November.
  15. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  16. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  18. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
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