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Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

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  • Jerome Mathis

    ()
    (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

A Sender-Receiver game is a two-player communication game in which a privately informed party (Sender) sends a payoff-irrelevant message on the basis of his information to a decision maker (Receiver) who then takes a payoff-relevant action. Seidmann-Winter (1997) provides necessary and sufficient conditions on players.preferences for full revelation when the Sender can certify all his payoff-relevant information and that he is not withholding information (formally, each type is certifiable). We generalize Seidmann- Winter's results to a partial certi.ability setting. We characterize the conditions on the information that the informed party can certify and more general conditions on players' preferences, which are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium outcome.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-02.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-02

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References

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  1. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  2. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
  3. Koessler, Frederic, 2003. "Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 393-399, June.
  4. Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1990. "The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 427-44, May.
  5. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
  6. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  7. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  8. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  9. Wolinsky, Asher, 2003. "Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 319-326, February.
  10. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  11. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research 23-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  12. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
  2. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
  4. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers, HAL hal-00675126, HAL.
  5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00652279 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Ryan, Matthew & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2011. "Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 256-262, August.
  7. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
  8. Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
  9. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  10. Alessandro Ispano, 2013. "Information Acquisition and the Value of bad News," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 2013-36, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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