Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 42 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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- T. Lanzi & J. Mathis, 2005.
"Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences,"
THEMA Working Papers
2005-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
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"Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types,"
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2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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- Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/168, Paris Dauphine University.
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"Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion,"
THEMA Working Papers
2006-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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- Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
- Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
- Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
- Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
- Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
- T. Lanzi & J. Mathis, 2004. "Argumentation in Sender-Receiver Games," THEMA Working Papers 2004-19, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
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