Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paul Milgrom

Abstract

Imagine that you are considering an investment in a new public offering of a firm's shares. The firm's officers make a presentation that includes an audited financial statement, an earnings forecast reviewed by its prestigious investment bankers, and an impressive demonstration of its new technology. Or suppose that you are buying a new furnace to replace an old one that is not working well. The salesman displays a chart showing that the projected total life-cycle cost of one particular model, including capital costs and fuel usage over the projected lifetime of the furnace, is lower than that of some competing models you have considered. This paper reviews the theoretical arguments about how sellers disclose information in an attempt to encourage buyers, and the potential role for regulation in encouraging efficient disclosure of information. How well does a system of private reporting work? When should we expect all the relevant information to be reported? If testing and reporting by the seller are costly, will too little testing and reporting be done? Or too much? When some information is withheld, what sort of information is withheld? How do rational buyers respond to such withholding? How are prices and welfare affected? What role is there for laws and regulations to improve the functioning of markets? We address these questions by studying the theory of persuasion games -- games in which one or more sellers provide verifiable information to buyers to influence the actions they take.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.stanford.edu/~milgrom/WorkingPapers/Rational%20Persuasion%2003082007.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000045.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000045

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "What Works in Securities Law?," NBER Working Papers 9882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," FMG Discussion Papers dp371, Financial Markets Group.
  5. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  7. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May.
  8. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  9. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  10. Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November.
  11. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
  12. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
  13. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
  2. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion," MPRA Paper 18697, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Clifford Winston, 2008. "The Efficacy of Information Policy: A Review of Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil's Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 704-17, September.
  4. Mingfeng Lin & Paulo Goes, 2012. "The Appeal of Third-party Certifications: Information Unraveling in Natural Experiments," Working Papers 12-02, NET Institute.
  5. De Borger, Bruno & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2012. "Information provision by regulated public transport companies," MPRA Paper 42267, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Jos Jansen & Andreas Pollak, 2014. "Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment," Economics Working Papers, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus 2014-20, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  7. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  9. Anderson, Simon P & Renault, Régis, 2012. "The advertising mix for a search good," CEPR Discussion Papers 8756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  11. Eső, Péter & Wallace, Chris, 2013. "Meggyőzés és megegyezés egy dinamikus alkujátékban
    [Persuasion and settlement in a dynamic bargaining game]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 930-939.
  12. de Meza, David Emmanuel & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Reyniers, Diane, 2010. "Disclosure, Trust and Persuasion in Insurance Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5060, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.