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Strategic argumentation

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  • Dziuda, Wioletta

Abstract

I analyze a game between an uninformed decision maker and a possibly biased expert. The expert receives a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. He can disclose each argument credibly, but cannot prove whether he has disclosed everything. In all equilibria, the biased expert sends messages containing arguments both for and against his preferred alternative. However, the decision maker is not influenced by the unfavorable arguments revealed by the biased expert. The latter is able to convince the decision maker to choose the biased expert[modifier letter apostrophe]s preferred alternative only if he reveals sufficiently many favorable arguments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 1362-1397

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1362-1397

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: Strategic communication Persuasion Argumentation Expert advice Disclosure games Two-sided messages;

References

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  15. Diamond, Peter A. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1974. "Increases in risk and in risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 337-360, July.
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  18. Wolinsky, Asher, 2003. "Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 319-326, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2003. "Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Paper Archive 497, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  2. Hunold, Matthias & Muthers, Johannes, 2012. "Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-028, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  3. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  4. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  5. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  6. Wioletta Dziuda & Ronen Gradwohl, 2013. "Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns," Discussion Papers 1572, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000369, www.najecon.org.
  8. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
  9. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  10. Alessandro Ispano, 2013. "Information Acquisition and the Value of bad News," Working Papers 2013-36, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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