Attention Manipulation and Information Overload
AbstractWhen a decision-maker’s attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker’s attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker’s knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 995.
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 13 Dec 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Communication; Information Overload; Limited Attention; Persuasion; Disclosure; Complexity; Consumer Protection; Salience;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- M38 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-01-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2014-01-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2014-01-10 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2014-01-10 (Operations Research)
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