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Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations

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Ran Spiegler
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000535.

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Date of creation: 21 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000535

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stefano Della Vigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2004. "Contract Design and Self-control: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 353-402, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000530, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2006. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(2), pages 505-540, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 212-223, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-47, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2004. "Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet," NBER Working Papers 10570, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Salop, Steven, 1977. "The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price Discrimination," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 393-406, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Inference By Believers In The Law Of Small Numbers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 775-816, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lal, Rajiv & Matutes, Carmen, 1994. "Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(3), pages 345-70, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4573, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "On the Optimal Pricing Policy of a Monopolist," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 164-76, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1993. "On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 473-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000530, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nava Ashraf & James Berry & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2007. "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia," NBER Working Papers 13247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ariel Rubinstein & Rani Spiegler, 2005. "Money Pumps in the Market," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000941, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Towards a theory of deception," PSE Working Papers 2005-28, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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