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Games with Procedurally Rational Players

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Author Info
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein

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Abstract

We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly ra- tional. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior. as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once. Then she chooses the action that has the best consequence. We define a notion of equilibrium for such situations and study its properties.

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Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1997-02.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1997
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Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1997-02

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-91.
  2. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chen, Hsiao-Chi & Friedman, James W. & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1997. "Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 32-54, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "A Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000037, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Steffen Huck & Rajiv Sarin, 2000. "Players with Limited Memory," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1645, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Marc Le Menestrel, 2003. "A One-Shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with Procedural Utility," Economics Working Papers 819, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ran Spiegler, 2001. "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 0009, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. C. R. Alcantud & Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2002. "Choice-Nash Equilibria," Vienna Economics Papers 0209, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ariel Rubinstein & Rani Spiegler, 2005. "Money Pumps in the Market," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000941, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rani Spiegler, 2005. "The Market for Quacks," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000634, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001011, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Philippe Jeniel, 2001. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 0003, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Droste, E. & Kosfeld, M. & Voorneveld, M., 1998. "Regret equilibria in games," Discussion Paper 19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, . "Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility," IEW - Working Papers iewwp076, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. José Alcantud & Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2007. "Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 455-464, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2001. "Beyond Bentham -- Measuring Procedural Utility," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  15. B. Luppi, 2006. "Price Competition over Boundedly Rational Agents," Working Papers 565, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ariel Rubinstein, 2006. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times," Discussion Papers 1424, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  17. Kobi Kriesler & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Increasing sales by introducing non-salable items," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(8), pages 631-641. [Downloadable!]
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