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• Marco Ottaviani
• Francesco Squintani
• Navin Kartik

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 134 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 93-116
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:93-116

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-4.