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Persuasion by Cheap Talk

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  • Archishman Chakraborty

    (Baruch College, City University of New York)

  • Rick Harbaugh

    (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)

Abstract

We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert's incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert -- cheap talk is "persuasive" -- if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including media bias, advertising, product recommendations, voting, and auction disclosure.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2006-10.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Publication status: Forthcoming in American Economic Review
Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2006-10

Note: Formally circulated as Clearly Biased Experts
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Keywords: multidimensional cheap talk; media bias; stock analysts; comparative advertising; negative advertising; lobbying; transparency;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Szalay, Dezsö, 2012. "Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 386, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-14, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  3. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Papers 384, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2012.
  4. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Persuasive Puffery," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2012-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  5. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  6. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers, University of Miami, Department of Economics 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  7. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning," Working Papers 479, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  8. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Papers 401, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2012.
  9. Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2013. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria," Working Papers 489, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  10. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  11. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  12. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
  13. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.

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