When Second Opinions Hurt: A Model of Expert Advice under Career Conce rns
AbstractWe augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world and (ii) the possibility that the principal might reverse her initial action after receiving an interim news. In this model, the principal's decisions as well as the expert's message endogenously determine the observability of the states and consequently, the assessment of the expert's ability by the principal. We show that having access to better interim news could reduce the welfare of the principal due to its strategic eff ect on the expert's recommendation. We also discuss the implication of the results for possible delegation of decision making to another person with di fferent preference parameters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-08.
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Career Concerns; Reputational Cheaptalk; Signaling Game;
Other versions of this item:
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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