1. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
5. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
6. Robert E. Verrecchia & Christian Leuz, 1999. "The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 41, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
7. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 757-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-34, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Murphy, K.J. & Gibbons, R., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence," Papers 90-09, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    • Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
11. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
13. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-79, June.
    Other versions:
    • Scharfstein, David. & Stein, Jeremy C., 1988. "Herd behavior and investment," Working papers WP 2062-88., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
14. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "Consumers and Agency Problems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C34-C51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
18. Leaver, Clare, 2002. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk: Theory and Evidence," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 121, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
19. Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 404, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
20. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Eric Le Borgne & Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2007. "Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power," IMF Working Papers 07/91, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
2. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern, 2005. "From Team Spirit to Jealousy: The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency," IZA Discussion Papers 1661, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern, 2005. "From Team Spirit to Jealousy: The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/08, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
3. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
4. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2007. "Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-055/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2008. "Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/18, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
5. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen & Shanna Rose, 2006. "The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 12921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Antonio Merlo & Andrea Mattozzi, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," 2005 Meeting Papers 740, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)