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Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns

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  • Balmaceda, Felipe

Abstract

This paper studies the cost and benefits of private and public communication in a game with a policy maker, a privately-informed expert, and the public. The policy maker and the expert have different opinions/views about the state of the world and both the expert and policy maker care about the expert's reputation with the public. The amount of information acquisition and transmission under private vs. public communication, depends on how much the policy maker and the expert differ in opinion. If both have either moderate or very extreme opinions, the costs and benefits are the same. In contrast, when the policy maker is moderate and the expert has more extreme opinions, private communication is better, while if the policy maker is extreme and the expert has moderate views, public communication is better.

Suggested Citation

  • Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:196:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001319
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hanzhe Li, 2022. "Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2204.08876, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private and public communication; Transparency; Experts; Non-common priors; Reputation; Accountability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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