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Abstract

This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4X4RWWM-1/2/4b135920b7950eec74c6833be015c398
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 869-884

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:869-884

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: Communication Information Cheap talk Mediation;

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Cited by:

1. Fox, Justin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2010. "Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 674-687, October.
2. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2010-19, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
   
   • Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
   • Lydia Mechtenberg & Johannes Münster, 2011. "A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-012, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
3. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012. "Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 588-611, December.
   
   • Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2011. "Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate," Working Papers 1113, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2011.
   • Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen, 2011. "Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate," MPRA Paper 33207, University Library of Munich, Germany.
4. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Cheap talk about the detection probability," DICE Discussion Papers 90, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
5. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
6. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
7. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
   
   • Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2011. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
   • Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

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