Communication via a strategic mediator
AbstractThis paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Communication Information Cheap talk Mediation;
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