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Noisy talk

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Author Info
Board, Oliver J. () (University of Pittsburgh)
Blume, Andreas () (University of Pittsburgh)
Kawamura, Kohei () (University of Edinburgh)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there exists a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20070395/71
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 395-440
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:263

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Martin J. Osborne).

Related research
Keywords: Communication; information transmission; cheap talk; noise;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
  2. Austen-Smith, David, 1994. "Strategic Transmission of Costly Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 955-63, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Navin Kartik, 2005. "Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000650, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
  4. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 183-203, Spring.
    Other versions:
  5. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," MPRA Paper 6300, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Oliver Board & Andreas Blume, 2008. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Papers 365, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Amegashie, J., 2007. "American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest?," Working Papers 2007-8, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hertel, Jo & Smith, John, 2009. "Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs," MPRA Paper 17056, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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