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Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk

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  • Navin Kartik

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Paper provided by www.najecon.org in its series NajEcon Working Paper Reviews with number 666156000000000650.

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Date of creation: 17 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000650

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Cited by:
  1. Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  2. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
  3. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. Kartik, Navin, 2007. "A note on cheap talk and burned money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 749-758, September.
  5. Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
  6. Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 21, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  7. Sjaak Hurkens & Navin Kartik, 2006. "(When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on ?Deception: The Role of Consequences?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 664.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-82, December.
  9. Vincent P Crawford, 2007. "Let’s Talk It Over: Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001449, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2006. "A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 425-442, October.
  12. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers, Concordia University, Department of Economics 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.

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