We analyze the information content of stock recommendations by a sell-side equity analyst when investors are uncertain about the analyst's incentives. In our model, an analyst can either be "unbiased", having incentives that are congruent with those of the investor, or "biased, having incongruent incentives.
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Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number
204.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:priwpu:204
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
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