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How to talk to multiple audiences

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  • Goltsman, Maria
  • Pavlov, Gregory

Abstract

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that the sender prefers communicating by private messages if the receivers' average bias is high, and by public messages if the receivers' average bias is low and the receivers are sufficiently polarized. When both public and private messages are allowed, the sender can combine the commitment provided by public communication with the flexibility of private communication and transmit more information to the receivers than under either private or public communication scenarios. When the players can communicate through a mediator and the receivers are biased in the same direction, it is optimal for the sender to communicate with the receivers through independent private noisy communication channels.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 72 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 100-122

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:100-122

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Communication Information Mechanism design Cheap talk Long cheap talk Multiple audiences;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
  3. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
  4. Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
  5. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
  6. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  7. Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana, 2010. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8146, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana, 2014. "Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 147-164.
  9. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  11. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
  12. Andrea Galeotti & Christian Ghiglino & Francesco Squintani, 2009. "Strategic Information Transmission in Networks," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 668, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  13. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  14. Duran, Mihael, 2013. "Board directors' preferences: What are good aggregation rules?," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 57, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
  15. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  16. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 15-30.
  17. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.

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