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Information acquisition and transparency in committees

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Author Info

  • Hans Gersbach

    ()

  • Volker Hahn

    ()

Abstract

We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0295-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 427-453

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:427-453

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Committees; Career concerns; Experts; Transparency; Information acquisition; D71;

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References

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  1. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
  2. Kerstin Gerling & Hans Peter Grüner & Alexandra Kiel & Elisabeth Schulte, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," Working Paper Series 256, European Central Bank.
  3. Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
  5. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
  6. Anne Sibert, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 226, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16, pages 321-345, November.
  8. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
  9. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
  10. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  11. John Fingleton, 2005. "Career Concerns of Bargainers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 179-204, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Svensson, Lars E O, 2009. "Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 7213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2008. "Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/18, European University Institute.
  3. Hahn, Volker, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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