Opinion as Incentives
AbstractWe study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise her about an unknown state of the world. There is a pool of available advisers who all have the same underlying preferences as the DM; they differ, however, in their prior beliefs about the state, which we interpret as differences of opinion. We derive atradeoff faced by the DM: an adviser with a greater difference of opinion has greater incentives to acquire information, but reveals less of any information she acquires, via strategic disclosure. Nevertheless, it is optimal to choose an adviser with at least some difference of opinion. The analysis reveals two novel incentives for an agent to acquire information: a ``persuasion'' motive and a motive to ``avoid prejudice.'' Delegation is costly for the DM because it eliminates both of these incentives. We also study the relationship between difference of opinion and difference of preference.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6094.
Date of creation: 08 Aug 2006
Date of revision: 15 Nov 2007
Other versions of this item:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Opinions as Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 815-860, October.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Navin Karthik, 2007. "Opinions as incentives," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0708-09, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-08 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2004. "Delegating Decisions to Experts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages S311-S335, February.
- Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
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