Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation
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AbstractThe contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Part I outlines relevant concepts in political economy, including implementation, community, ideology, and institutions. Part II covers theory and applications of the spatial model of voting. Part III considers the different characteristics that govern the behaviour of institutions, while Part IV analyses competition between political representatives. Part V is concerned with the way in which government acquires information held by voters or advisors, and Part VI addresses government choice on monetary policy and taxation.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521417815 and published in 1993.
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- Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010.
"Serving the Public Interest,"
NRN working papers
2010-21, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Markus Müller, 2009. "Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/114, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Freeman, John R., 1996. "A Computable Equilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economy," Bulletins 7484, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
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