Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 617.
Date of creation: 15 Apr 1998
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- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
- Celentani, Marco & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996.
"Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent,"
Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/4815, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
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