In the United States, more than two-thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children. In contrast, intra vivos gifts are usually unequal. These findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle, based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent's altruistic preferences. The theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture, which prevails in other societies.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
7791.
Length: Date of creation: Jul 2000 Date of revision: Publication status: published as Bernheim, B. Douglas and Sergei Severinov. "Bequests As Signals: An Explanation For The Equal Division Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, 2003, v111(4,Aug), 733-764. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7791
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
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Emrah Arbak & Laurence Kranich, 2005.
"Can Wages Signal Kindness?,"
Working Papers
0511, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
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