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Competing with Equivocal Information

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Author Info

  • Eduardo Perez-Richet

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

This paper studies strategic disclosure by multiple senders competing for prizes awarded by a single receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both verifiable and equivocal (it can inuence the receiver both ways). The standard unrav- eling argument breaks down: if the commonly known probability that her information is favorable is high, a single sender never discloses. Competition restores full disclosure only if some of the senders are sufficiently unlikely to have favorable information. When the senders are uncertain about each other's strength, however, all symmetric equilibria approach full disclosure as competition increases.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00675126.

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Date of creation: 29 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00675126

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00675126
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Related research

Keywords: Strategic Information Transmission; Persuasion Games; Communication; Competition; Multiple Senders.;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

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  1. Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky, 2009. "A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation," NBER Working Papers 15237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
  3. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  4. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2008. "Information Gathering and Marketing," Working Papers 08-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Mathis, Jérôme, 2008. "Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
  6. Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
  7. Wilson, Chris M., 2010. "Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 496-506, September.
  8. Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
  9. Kyle Bagwell & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2005. "Look How Little I’m Advertising!," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  10. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Strategic Information Revelation when Experts Compete to Influence," Working Papers 453, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2013.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-00675135, HAL.

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