Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Information Gathering and Marketing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Heski Bar-Isaac
  • Guillermo Caruana
  • Vicente Cuñat

Abstract

"Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can acquire more-detailed information. Marketing makes it easier or harder for these consumers to do so. When consumers are "ex ante" heterogeneous, the firm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite different reasons. First, as a nonprice means of discrimination-it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the firm cannot commit to a given investment in ensuring quality, the marketing and pricing strategy can act as a commitment device." Copyright (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=jems&volume=19&issue=2&year=2010&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 375-401

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:2:p:375-401

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1058-6407&site=1

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bharat N. Anand & Ron Shachar, 2011. "Advertising, the matchmaker," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 205-245, 06.
  2. Saak, Alexander E., 2006. "The optimal private information in single unit monopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 267-272, May.
  3. Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 1999. "Timing of Seasonal Sales," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(4), pages 545-72, October.
  4. Simon P. Anderson & R�gis Renault, 2006. "Advertising Content," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 93-113, March.
  5. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
  6. Anthony Creane, 2008. "A note on welfare-improving ignorance about quality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 585-590, March.
  7. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
  8. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On information and competition in private value auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006.
  9. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2005. "Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  10. Marc Möller & Makoto Watanabe, 2010. "Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clearance Sales," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(547), pages 1125-1148, 09.
  11. Paul Wachtel & Rainer Haselmann, 2007. "Risk Taking by Banks in the Transition Countries," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Paul Wachtel & Rainer Haselmann, 2007. "Risk Taking by Banks in the Transition Countries," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms and the Role of Consumer Protection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 1002-1026.
  3. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
  4. Renault, Régis & Anderson, Simon P., 2013. "The Advertising Mix for a Search Good," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12407, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Peitz, Martin & Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Informing Consumers about their own Preferences," Working Papers 12-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  6. Bing Jing, 2011. "Seller honesty and product line pricing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 403-427, December.
  7. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cuñat, 2009. "Search, Design and Market Structure," Working Papers 09-17, NET Institute, revised Sep 2009.
  8. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2011. "Pre-sale information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2333-2355.
  10. Joaquín Coleff, 2011. "Product reliability, consumers’ complaints and market performance: the case of consumers’ associations," Economics Working Papers we1121, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  11. Janko Gorter, 2012. "Commission Bans and the Source and Quality of Financial Advice," DNB Working Papers 350, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-00675135, HAL.
  13. Marc Möller & Makoto Watanabe, 2013. "Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 4490, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Agostino Manduchi, 2013. "Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 1-25, May.
  15. Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin & Rosar, Frank, 2011. "Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 141-162, January.
  16. Bang, Se Hoon & Kim, Jaesoo, 2013. "Price discrimination via information provision," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 215-224.
  17. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 780-809, April.
  18. Marc M�ller & Makoto Watanabe, 2013. "Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-185/V, Tinbergen Institute.
  19. Paunic, Alida, 2009. "I did it my way," MPRA Paper 17547, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:2:p:375-401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.