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Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered

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Author Info
Khalil, F
Rochet, J-C

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-15.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-15

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Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330
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Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMETRICS ; INFORMATION ; CONTRACTS ; DECISION MAKING;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

Cited by:
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  1. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2007. "Information Acquisition and Refunds for Returns," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. James Malcomson, 2004. "Principal and Expert Agent," Economics Series Working Papers 193, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Doh Shin Jeon, . "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2008. "Information Gathering and Marketing," Working Papers 08-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  10. Ulf Schiller, 1997. "Decentral Information Acquisition and the Value of Cost Observability," Game Theory and Information 9710003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2005. "Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1999. "Endogenous Information Structures," Economics Working Papers 386, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ed Nosal, 2003. "Information gathering by a principal," Working Paper 0307, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  16. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles, 2003. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition," IDEI Working Papers 205, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  17. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Daniel Krämer & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning," Papers 036, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
  19. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Goeschl, Timo & Lin, Tun, 2004. "Endogenous Information Structures in Conservation Contracting," Staff Paper Series 479, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Pre-Contractual Information Acquisition," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv154, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.


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