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Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Khalil, F
Rochet, J-C
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In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.
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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
97-15.
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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1997Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-15Contact details of provider: Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330 Email: Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Goldblatt).
Keywords: ECONOMETRICS ; INFORMATION ; CONTRACTS ; DECISION MAKING ; Other versions of this item:
Article Paper Khalil, F & Rochet, J-C, 1997.
"Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
97-15, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1996.
"Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered ,"
IDEI Working Papers
61, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Cremer, J. & Khalil, F & Rochet, J.-C., 1996.
"Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered ,"
Papers
976.425, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Cremer, J. & Khalil, F. & Rochet, J-C., 1997.
"Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered ,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
9708, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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