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Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk

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Author Info
Shavell, Steven

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 21 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 259-70
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:259-70

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  1. Omri Ben-Shahar, 1999. "The Cost of Compensation: Revisiting Contract Remedies in Repeat Play Settings," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1124, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
    [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]
    ," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Omri Ben-Shahar, 1999. "Rights Eroding by Past Breach," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1001, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Chris William Sanchirico & Alexander S. P. Pfaff, 2004. "Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of EPA's Self- Audit Policy," Public Economics 0403007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Oren Bar-Gill & Assaf Hamdani, 2003. "Optimal Liability for Libel," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.


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