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Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature

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Author Info
Cremer, Jacques
Khalil, Fahad

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45R2GBB-R/2/13e4c75ba27d1d36c9e76098b5fbd3bc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (April)
Pages: 675-682
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:3-4:p:675-682

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  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  3. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ulf Schiller, 1997. "Decentral Information Acquisition and the Value of Cost Observability," Game Theory and Information 9710003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1999. "Endogenous Information Structures," Economics Working Papers 386, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan J. Ganuza, 1998. "Competition and Cost Overruns. Optimal Misspecification of Procurement Contracts," Economics Working Papers 471, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
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