We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved.
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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
97-16.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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