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Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Daniel Krämer ()
Roland Strausz ()
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The paper studies procurement contracts with pre--project investigations under hidden information and hidden action. The principal generally benefits from inducing the agent to conduct pre--project investigations to avoid cost overruns and false project cancelations. Due to a rent effect, hidden information leads to systematic distortions in information acquisition: the agent acquires too much information to prevent cost overruns and too little information to prevent false project cancelations. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts which exhibit a costly quitting option. They achieve the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation.
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Date of creation: 23 Jan 2009Date of revision:
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Keywords: Information acquisition ; procurement ; screening ; implementation errors ; Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Other versions:
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Review of Economic Studies ,
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Other versions:
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Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
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Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991.
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IDEI Working Papers
5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!] Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991.
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Working Papers
91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Reiche, S., 2008.
"Sequential Screening and Renegotiation ,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0820, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
[Downloadable!]
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