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Sequential, multidimensional screening

Author

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  • Litterscheid, Sina
  • Szalay, Dezsö

Abstract

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of distortions. For mild complements or substitutes, a simple solution procedure picks up the optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Litterscheid, Sina & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "Sequential, multidimensional screening," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100621
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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