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Information Gathering and Marketing

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  • Heski Bar-Isaac
  • Guillermo Caruana
  • Vicente Cunat

Abstract

"Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can acquire more-detailed information. Marketing makes it easier or harder for these consumers to do so. When consumers are "ex ante" heterogeneous, the firm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite different reasons. First, as a nonprice means of discrimination-it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the firm cannot commit to a given investment in ensuring quality, the marketing and pricing strategy can act as a commitment device." Copyright (c) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-17.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-17

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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References

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  1. Anderson, Simon P & Renault, Régis, 2005. "Advertising Content," CEPR Discussion Papers 5064, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On information and competition in private value auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006.
  3. Marc Möller & Makoto Watanabe, 2010. "Advance Purchase Discounts Versus Clearance Sales," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(547), pages 1125-1148, 09.
  4. Anthony Creane, 2008. "A note on welfare-improving ignorance about quality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 585-590, March.
  5. Paul Wachtel & Rainer Haselmann, 2007. "Risk Taking by Banks in the Transition Countries," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  6. Saak, Alexander E., 2006. "The optimal private information in single unit monopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 267-272, May.
  7. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2005. "Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson, 2004. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," Economics Series Working Papers 185, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Bharat N. Anand & Ron Shachar, 2011. "Advertising, the matchmaker," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 205-245, 06.
  10. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 1998. "Timing of seasonal sales," Economics Working Papers 331, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2011. "Pre-sale information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2333-2355.
  2. Janko Gorter, 2012. "Commission Bans and the Source and Quality of Financial Advice," DNB Working Papers 350, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Bang, Se Hoon & Kim, Jaesoo, 2013. "Price discrimination via information provision," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 215-224.
  4. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cuñat, 2009. "Search, Design and Market Structure," Working Papers 09-17, NET Institute, revised Sep 2009.
  5. Agostino Manduchi, 2013. "Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 1-25, May.
  6. Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device," CEPR Discussion Papers 6664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Bing Jing, 2011. "Seller honesty and product line pricing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 403-427, December.
  8. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms, and the Role of Consumer Protection," Working Papers 465, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  10. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
  11. Paul Wachtel & Rainer Haselmann, 2007. "Risk Taking by Banks in the Transition Countries," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2012. "Informing consumers about their own preferences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 417-428.
  13. Eduardo Perez-Richet & Delphine Prady, 2012. "Complicating to Persuade?," Working Papers hal-00675135, HAL.
  14. Marc Möller & Makoto Watanabe, . "Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-185/V, Tinbergen Institute.
  15. Joaquín Coleff, 2011. "Product reliability, consumers’ complaints and market performance: the case of consumers’ associations," Economics Working Papers we1121, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  16. Marc Möller & Makoto Watanabe, 2013. "Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 4490, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Paunic, Alida, 2009. "I did it my way," MPRA Paper 17547, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Renault, Régis & Anderson, Simon P., 2013. "The Advertising Mix for a Search Good," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12407, Paris Dauphine University.
  19. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 780-809, April.

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