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Abstract

We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent) ideal actions and different incentives to coordinate with each others. A fully revealing sequential equilibrium exists in the disclosure game if each player's ideal action is monotonic in types and types are independently distributed, but may fail to exist with non-monotonic ideal actions or correlated types. When biases between players' ideal actions are constant across states, complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. In that case, there is a fully revealing sequential equilibrium in which informational incentive constraints are satisfied ex-post, so it exists for all possible prior beliefs, even when players' types are correlated. This existence result applies whether information disclosure is private or public, and is extended to partial certifiability of information.

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File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/65/22/79/PDF/wp201141.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00652279.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00652279

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00652279
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Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Certifiable types ; Coordination ; Information disclosure ; Multi-divisional organizations;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
• NEP-CTA-2012-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
• NEP-MIC-2012-01-03 (Microeconomics)

References

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