Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE -super-*

Contents:

Author Info

  • OLIVER BOARD

Abstract

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high-quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00369.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 197-213

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:1:p:197-213

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. David Dranove & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2010. "Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice," NBER Working Papers 15644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. V. Joseph Hotz & Mo Xiao, 2006. "Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers," NBER Working Papers 11937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Panos Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2013. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Working Papers 13-25, NET Institute.
  4. Anderson, Simon P & Renault, Régis, 2012. "The advertising mix for a search good," CEPR Discussion Papers 8756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0703, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  6. Saak, Alexander E., 2011. "A Model of Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103540, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 106-126, March.
  8. James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, 2010. "The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with Mortgage Borrowers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 516-21, May.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00652279 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
  11. Michiel Bijlsma & Pierre Koning & Victoria Shestalova, 2013. "The Effect of Competition on Process and Outcome Quality of Hospital Care in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 161(2), pages 121-155, June.
  12. Koessler, Frédéric & Renault, Régis, 2012. "When Does a Firm Disclose Product Information?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12406, Paris Dauphine University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:1:p:197-213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.