Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification
AbstractThis note compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It also emphasizes the role of belief consistency conditions in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-12.
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
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Certifiable information; cheap talk; consistency of beliefs;
Other versions of this item:
- Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-314, May.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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