Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
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- Ying Chen & Wojciech Olszewski, 2014. "Effective Persuasion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 319-347, May.
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Keywords
Optimal persuasion rules Credibility Determinism Concavity Commitment Evidence;Statistics
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