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• Dominique Demougin
• Claude Fluet

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 45 (2001)
Issue (Month): 9 (October)
Pages: 1741-1764
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:45:y:2001:i:9:p:1741-1764

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1. Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, 2003. "Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity," Cahiers de recherche 0325, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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   • Benjamin Bental & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Incentive Contracts And Total Factor Productivity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1033-1055, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Dennis Dittrich & Martin G. Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-098/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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   • Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
3. Eva-Maria Steiger, 2006. "Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Efficiency in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-17, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
4. Joerg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0309003, EconWPA, revised 02 Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jörg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0310001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Jörg Schiller, 2006. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 421-438. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2000. "Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 120, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
6. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournament," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-18, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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   • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournaments," Cahiers de recherche 0322, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
7. Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2009. "Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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   • Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2008. "Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 191, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
8. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents," Cahiers de recherche 0419, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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   • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-47, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
   • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies," MPRA Paper 2469, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "Performance measurement in multi-task agencies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 148-163, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
11. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Erling Røed Larsen and Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2006. "The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord Characteristics and Interaction," Discussion Papers 467, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
13. Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    • Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," Discussion Papers 245, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 3702, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
14. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    • Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Discussion Papers 232, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
17. Avner Ben-Ner & Fanmin Kong & Stephanie Lluis, . "Uncertainty and Organization Design," Working Papers 0107, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus). [Downloadable!]
18. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-10, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious," Cahiers de recherche 0318, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]

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