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Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model

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Author Info
Kim, Son Ku
Abstract

Different information systems are compared in terms of their relative efficiencies in an agency model. The mean preserving spread relation between the likelihood ratio distributions derived from the original information systems is found to be sufficient to rank information systems under quite general assumptions about the agent's utility function. Furthermore, it is shown that the mean preserving spread criterion can be applied to a broader set of information systems than Holmstrom's informativeness criterion and Blackwell's theorem. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-102
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:1:p:89-102

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  1. Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Katz, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series 1004, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, . "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  8. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  9. Roland Strausz, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Papers 27, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Joachim Gassen, 2008. "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-028, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2007. "Moral hazard and persistence," Working Paper 07-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  13. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  14. Christian Lukas, 2007. "Managerial expertise, learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 195-211. [Downloadable!]
  15. Newman, Andrew, 2007. "Risk-bearing and Entrepreneurship," CEPR Discussion Papers 6021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2007. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 287-307, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Paper 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  19. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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