Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ram Singh

    ()

  • Francesco Parisi

    ()

Abstract

Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an e ffect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effeciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation. [Working Paper No. 179]

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document12072010580.3570368.pdf&fcategory=Articles&AId=2681&fref=repec
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 403 Forbidden. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Padma Prakash)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:2681.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2681

Note: Institutional Papers
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.esocialsciences.org

Related research

Keywords: torts; loss-sharing; negligence; strict liability; comparative causation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working papers 173, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  2. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
  3. Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, 2002. "No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 258-294.
  4. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-47, June.
  5. Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, eSocialSciences.
  6. David Kaye & Mikel Aickin, 1984. "A Comment on Causal Apportionment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 191-208, January.
  7. Hylton, Keith N., 2002. "An asymmetric-information model of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 153-175, August.
  8. Peter Van Wijck & Jan Winters, 2001. "The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 319-332, May.
  9. Paul Burrows, 1999. "A Deferential Role for Efficiency Theory in Analysing Causation-Based Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 29-49, July.
  10. Lowe, Vaughan, 2007. "International Law," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199268849, October.
  11. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
  12. Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March.
  13. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
  14. Chung, T.Y., 1992. "Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 9215, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  15. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, October.
  16. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
  17. Singh Ram, 2007. "Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 383-406, December.
  18. Lando, Henrik, 1997. "An attempt to incorporate fairness into an economic model of tort law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-587, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Working Papers of BETA 2014-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  2. Dehez, Pierre & Ferey, Samuel, 2013. "How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 44-50.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2681. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.