The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation
AbstractComparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an e ffect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effeciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation. [Working Paper No. 179]
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torts; loss-sharing; negligence; strict liability; comparative causation;
Other versions of this item:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-31 (All new papers)
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