Efficient Standards of Due Care: Should Courts Find More Parties Negligent Under Comparative Negligence?
AbstractWe show that negligence standards should differ under comparative and contributory negligence regimes. If due care standards are allowed to vary with the laws of a jurisdiction, then comparative and contributory negligence may be equally efficient, even in a model with evidentiary uncertainty. It is commonly observed that jurors are naturally inclined to be more lenient to plaintiffs on the issue of plaintiff negligence in contributory negligence jurisdictions. We show that such lenience may actually be efficient in addition to satisfying jurors' senses of equity. A similar conclusion applies to defendants.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 93-218.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 1993
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econwp.html
More information through EDIRC
Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Other versions of this item:
- Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Olbrich, Anja, 2008. "Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 78-88, March.
- Ram Singh, 2008.
"On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules,"
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Anja Olbrich, 2008. "The optimal negligence standard in health care under supply-side cost sharing," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 73-85, June.
- Fluet, Claude, 2010.
"Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-9, March.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005.
"The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 207-237, 01.
- FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009.
"Liability insurance under the negligence rule,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508.
- Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010.
"The Efficiency of Comparative Causation,"
Review of Law & Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
- Kim, Jeonghyun & Feldman, Allan M., 2006. "Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 455-477, December.
- Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Innes, Robert, 2004. "Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 29-48, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.