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Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation

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Author Info
Innes, Robert

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 29-48
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:1:p:29-48

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  1. Gerrit de Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, Though Judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  3. Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006. "The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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