Francesco Parisi (University of Minnesota and University of BolognaDepartment of Economics) Ram Singh (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)
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Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an effect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the eciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation.
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Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number
179.
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