Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant
AbstractIn some recent works, negligence-based liability has been severely criticized. It has been argued that negligence-based liability does not form a convincing basis for liability assignment. Causation-based liability has been proposed as an alternative basis of liability determination. Parisi and Fon (2004) have studied the efficiency properties of the causal apportionment of liability. The authors have shown that when care levels as well as activity levels of the parties affect the causation of an accident, causation based liability does not provide efficient incentives for the parties. In this paper, we assume the activity levels to be constant. Under this assumption, we have demonstrated the existence of liability rules that are efficient and at the same time `consistent' with the requirement of causation liability. In addition, it is shown that under these rules the equilibrium outcome is unique. The analysis has been undertaken in a very general framework.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010.
"The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation,"
- Ram Singh, 2008.
"On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules,"
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Working Papers of BETA 2014-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Qi Zhou, 2009. "Economic analysis of the legal standard for deceit in English tort law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 83-102, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.