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On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance

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  • Steven Shavell

    (Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard University, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research)

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    Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance.

    Volume (Year): 25 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 166-179

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    Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:25:y:2000:i:2:p:166-179

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    Cited by:
    1. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal negligence rule under limited liability," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004.
    2. Wright, Donald J., 2011. "Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics 2011-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    3. D’Antoni, Massimo & Tabbach, Avraham D., 2014. "Inadequate compensation and multiple equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 33-47.
    4. Benjamin Lorent, 2006. "Raisons fondamentales d'une régulation prudentielle du secteur des assurances," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 49(3), pages 203-244.
    5. Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, 2003. "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws in Traffic Fatalities," NBER Working Papers 9602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Jean-Charles Rochet & StÈphane Villeneuve, 2010. "Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 73-118, 01.
    7. Hultkrantz, Lars & Nilsson, Jan-Eric & Arvidsson, Sara, 2012. "Voluntary internalization of speeding externalities with vehicle insurance," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 926-937.
    8. Fernando Gomez-Pomar & Mireia Artigot-Golobardes, . "Wer sollte die Kosten von Unfällen am Arbeitsplatz tragen? Die schwierige Koordination von Arbeiterunfallversicherung und Delikthaftung aus ökonomischer Sicht," German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press 2004-1-1105, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    9. G. Dari Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.

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